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II.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
ner Brian
This is a respon se brief of the Idaho Transportation Depart ment (ITD). Petitio

t Court and the
Clyde Watkins (Watkins) reques ts this Court to reverse the decisio n of the Distric
18-800
hearing officer, who determ ined that the requirements of Idaho Code Section

2A were met

and that Watkin s' driving privileges should be suspended for ninety (90) days.

B. Course of Proceedings
R., pp. 10Watkins was aneste d on Octobe r 10, 2020 and issued a Notice of Suspension.
11. On or about Octobe r 13, 2020 Watkins, through counsel, reques ted a hearing

with ITD. R., pp.

hearing
18-19. The hearing was held on Octobe r 29, 2020. R., p. 35. On Novem ber 4, 2020 the
sion. A Motion for
officer issued his decisio n uphold ing the 90 day administrative license suspen
for Reconsideration
Reconsideration was filed on Novem ber 6, 2020. R., pp. 53-55. The Motion
to Distric t Court
was denied by Order issued on Novem ber 18, 2020. R., pp. 60-62. The appeal
heard the arguments
was filed on or about Novem ber 6, 2020. See Court File. The Distric t Court
May 13, 2021. See
of counsel and issued its Opinio n Denyin g Petition for Judicial Review on
Court's file. This appeal followed.

C. Statement of Facts
by Watkins
On Octobe r 10, 2020, Troope r Chris Middleton observ ed a vehicle driven
traveling southbound on State Highw ay 3 near milepo st 8. The vehicle display

ed a white light on

IC Section 49-910,
the rear of the cab (cargo light). Becaus e this cargo light was in violatio n of
ted Watkins had been
the trooper initiated a traffic stop. The trooper identified Watkin s and suspec
notified
drinking. The trooper conduc ted field sobriety tests, which Watkins failed. The trooper
s failed the breath
Watkins of his rights. Then the trooper gave Watkin s two breath tests. Watkin
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Ignition
tests (.092 and .089). R., pp. 10-11. Watkins was issued a "Suspension and Mandatory

10-11.
Interlock Advisory" (also called a Notice of Suspension) and an-ested for DUI. R., pp.

See
Watkins' driver's license suspension was stayed pending the appeal by the District Court.
Court's file.

III. ISSUES PRESE NTED
A. Was the hearing officer' s decision that the trooper had legal cause to stop Watkins

supported by the law and substantial evidence?

B. Whether Watkins' right to due process were violated by inaccurate statements in the
police repo1t?
C. Whether the evidence of the officer's certification as a breath test operator was
sufficient to sustain the administrative license suspension?
IV.

STANDARD OF REVIE W

The administrative license suspension (ALS) statute, I.C. § 18-8002A, requires that the
ITD suspend the driver's license of a driver who has failed a BAC test administered by a law
enforcement trooper. Bennettv. State, Dept. ofTransp., 147 Jdaho 141,20 6 P.3d50 5 (Idaho

App. 2009). The period of suspension is ninety days for a driver's first failure of an evidentiary
A
test and one year for any subsequent test failure within five years. LC. § 18-8002A(4)(a).
person who has been notified of an ALS may request a hearing before a hearing trooper
designated by the ITD to contest the suspension. I.C. § 18-8002A(7). At the administrative
hearing, the burden of proof rests upon the driver to prove any of the grounds to vacate the
suspension. LC.§ 18-8002A(7); Kane v. State, Dep't ofTrans p., 139 Idaho 586,590 , 83 P.3d

130, 134 (Ct.App.2003). The hearing trooper must uphold the suspension unless he or she finds,
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by a preponderance of the evidence, that the driver has shown one of

several grounds enumerated

e:
in LC. § 18-8002A(7) for vacating the suspension. Those grounds includ
(a) The peace troope r did not have legal cause to stop the person; or
driving or was in
(b) The trooper did not have legal cause to believe the person had been
l, drugs or other
actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcoho
4, 18-8004C or
18-800
n
intoxicating substances in violation of the provisions of sectio
18-8006, Idaho Code; or
ce of drugs or
(c) The test results did not show an alcohol concentration or the presen
or 18-8006,
C
other intoxicating substances in violation of section 18-8004, l 8-8004
Idaho Code; or
nces
(d) The tests for alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substa
in accordance with
administered at the direction of the peace trooper were not conducted
ent was not
the requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing equipm
functioning properly when the test was administered; or
evidentiary testing
(e) The person was not informed of the consequences of submitting to
as required in subsection (2) of this section.
nge
LC. § l 8-8002A(7). The hearing trooper's decision is subject to challe

throug h a petition for

at 133.
judicial review. I.C. § 18-8002A(8); Kane, 139 Idaho at 589, 83 P.3d
The Idaho Administrative Procedures Act (IDAPA) also governs the
depaitment decisions to deny, cancel, suspend, disqualify, revoke, or

review of

restrict a person's driver's

license. See I.C. §§ 49-201, 49-330, 67-5201(2), 67-5270. ITD has adopte

d IDAP A rules for

governed by the
ALS suspensions. See IDAP A 39.02.72.00, et seq. ALS appeals are also

Idaho

A 39.02.72.003. IDAP A
Rules of Administrative Procedw-e of the Attorney General. See IDAP
04.l 1.01.052 provides for liberal construction of the rules and states:
and economical
The rules in this chapte r will be liberally construed to secure just, speedy
by statute, the
determination of all issues presented to the agency. Unless prohibited
iance with them is
agency may pem1it deviation from these rules when it finds that compl
by statute, the
ed
impracticable, unnec essaiy or not in the public interest. Unless requir
apply to
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and the Idaho Rules of Evidence do not
3)
contested case proceedings conducted before the agency. (7-1-9
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206 P.3d 505 (Ct App
In Bennett v. State Department ofTransportation, 147 Idaho 141,
2009), the Comt of Appeals restated the necessary standard of review

for the Court reviewing the

ent part:
decision of the hearing trooper. The Court of Appeals stated, in pertin
as to the weight of the
This Comt does not substitute its judgment for that of the agency
48 P.3d at 669. This
evidence presented. LC. § 67-5279(1); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,
y erroneous.
clearl
are
Court instead defers to the agency's findings of fact unless they
1265 (1998);
Castaneda v. Brighton Corp., 130 Idaho 923,9 26,95 0 P.2d 1262,
y's factual
agenc
the
,
words
Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669. In other
conflicting
is
determinations are binding on the reviewing court, even where there
rted by substantial
evidence before the agency, so long as the determinations are suppo
ofCom m'rs, 134
Bd
rel.
ex
competent evidence in the record. Urrutia v. Blaine County,
48 P.3d at 669.
Idaho 353, 357, 2 P.3d 738, 742 (2000); Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340,
nces,
A court may overturn an agency's decision where its findings, infere
ions; (b) exceed the

conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or constitutional provis
(d) are not supported
agency's statutory authotity; (c) are made upon unlawful procedure;
or ru1 abuse of
by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious,
on must
decisi
y
discretion. I.C. § 67-52 79(3) . The party challenging the agenc
79(3) and that a
demonstrate that the agency e1Ted in a manner specified in LC.§ 67~52
County Bd ofCounty
substantial right of that party has been prejudiced. Price v. Payette
all, 137 Idaho at 340, 48
Comm'rs, 131 Idaho 426,4 29, 958 P.2d 583,586 (1998); Marsh
shall be set aside ...
P.3d at 669. If the agency's decision is not affirmed on appeal, "it
.
and remanded for further proceedings as necessary." LC. § 67-5279(3)
ish that ITD
Id., at 506-507. Therefore, the burden is on the petitioner to establ

erred in a manner

a substantial right has been
specified in Idaho Code Section 67-5279(3) and then establish that
ofIdaho
prejudiced. This issue was discussed by the Comt of Appeal in State

v. Kalani-Keegan,

:
155 Idaho 297, 311 P.3d 309 (Ct. App. 2013) where the Comt stated
must demonstrate the
It is well established that the party challenging an agency decision
ntial right of that
substa
a
that
agency ened in a manner specified in LC.§ 67-5279(3) and
re, 147 Idaho 257,
party has been prejudiced. Wheeler v. Idaho Dep't ofHealth & Welfa
260,207 P.3d 988, 991 (2009).
requirements in any
Further, nothing in IDAPA requires the courts to address these two
Idaho 228,2 32,25 4
paiticular order. Hawkins v. Bonneville Cnty. Bd. ofCom m'rs, 151
ed solely on the
P.3d 1224, 1228 (2011). Therefore, an agency's decision may be affirm
right. Id. In other
grounds that the petitioner has not shown prejudice to a substantial
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a manner specified by
words, the courts may forego analyzing whether an agency erred in
was violated. Id.
I.C. § 67-5279(3) if the petitioner does not show that a substantial right

Id., at page 313.
V.AR GUM ENT

A.

LEG AL CAU SE TO STOP

ct
Watkins argues that the Court should reverse the decision of the Distri

Coutt and the

s that the hearing
hearing officer which suspended his driver's privileges. Watkins allege
y and factually defective.
officer's finding that there was legal cause for the traffic stop is legall
Watkins' arguments are without merit.
ility of witnesses,
The Hearing Officer. At the ALS hearing, the power to assess the credib
nces from the evidence is
resolve factual conflicts, weigh the evidence and draw factual infere
driver's counsel, the hearing
vested with the hearing officer. After hearing the arguments of the
ed Watkins' assertion that
officer reviewed the record and Idaho law. The hearing officer reject
:
his driver's license should not be suspended. The hearing officer stated

sets forth and asserts
I. The Probable Cause Affidavit submitted by ISP Sergeant Middleton
Dodge 2500
on October JO, 2020, at approximately 2122 hours, he stopped a white
milepost 8 in
(Idaho Plate I L8955T) traveling southbound on State Highway 3 near
e in violation of
Latah County, Idaho, for displaying white light to the rear ofthe vehicl
le's white light
Idaho Code §49-910. Sergeant Middleton visually identified the vehic
eton conducted a
illuminated on the back ofthe cab as it passed him. Sergeant Middl
traffic stop and identified the driver as Brian Watkins.
s and reflectors mounted
2. Idaho Code §49-910(3) sets forth in part that all lighting device
t the stoplight or other
on the rear ofany vehicle shall display or reflect a red color, excep
the light illuminating
signal devices, which may be red, amber, or yellow and except that
may be white,
the license plate shall be white and the light emitted by a back-up lamp
amber or red.
R.,p. 38.
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the stop was without
The hearing officer rejected the argument of Watkins' attorney that
light was not normal driving
reasonable suspicion. The hearing officer found that use of a cargo

behavior, he wrote:
ns was driving
4. In the case at hand, Sergeant Middleton observed the vehicle Watki
eton visually identified
displaying ofwhite light to the rear ofthe vehicle. Sergeant Middl
the vehicle 's white light illuminated on the back ofthe cab.
that Sergeant Middleton is
5. One can reasonably infer fi'om his experience and training
day driving. Failure to
well aware ofhow a normal motorist drives in the course ofevery
range ofnormal
do what is required by statute cannot be characterized as within the
driving behavior.
the hearing officer co1Tectly
R., p.39. The hearing officer reviewed relevant Idaho case law. And

noted the following:
evidence ofa crime will be
6. Probable cause means, "A fair probability that contraband or
usly less demanding
found, " and the level ofsuspicion requiredfor a Terry stop is obvio
I, 7 (1989).
than thatfor probable cause. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S.
set of
7. Reasonable suspicion is obtained by adding up all the facts [the entire
officers, based on
circumstances] known to the officer. The courts then permit police
information known.
their training and experience, to make logical inferences fi'om the
l inferences from
Reasonable suspicion ofcriminal activity is based on fact and logica
have an objective
those facts. Based on the whole picture, the detaining officer must
ant Middleton met
basis for suspecting the particular person stopped. In this case, Serge
this objective and acted accordingly.
the license plate or
8. In the case at hand, the cargo light is neither the light illuminating
tively in conducting a
the back-up lamps. Sergeant Middleton acted reasonably and objec
a white light was
traffic stop on the vehicle Watkins was driving and to investigate why
10(3). Under these
illuminated on the back of the cab in violation ofIdaho Code §49-9
seizure.
circumstances, Watkins' traffic stop does not constitute an unlcrnful
following
R., p. 39. Regarding the burden of proof, the hearing officer made the

findings:

a law enforcement officer
9. Due weigh t must be given to the reasonable inference that

Hedgecock, 147
is entitled to draw from the facts in light ofhis experience. State v
Idaho 580 (Ct. App. 2009).
forth in Sergeant
10. Watldns presented insufficient argument to refute the assertions set
stop was unlawful
Middleton's Probable Cause Affidavit, or to prove that the traffic
or that Watkins ' constitutional rights were violated

R.,p. 40.
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The hearing officer concluded his findings of legal cause of stop

by making the following

conclusions.

a traffic stop on
11. Sergeant Middleton acted reasonably and objectively in conducting
the vehicle Watkins was driving. Thus, Watkins' argument fails.
12. Watkins violated Idaho Code §49-910(3).
e Watkins was driving.
13. Sergeam Middleton posse ssed legal cause to stop the vehicl
nce. As such, the findings of
R., pp. 39-40. The findings of fact are supported by substantial evide
legal conclusions of the
fact are binding on the District Comt and on this Court. Further, the
hearing officer are suppo1ted by Idaho law.
be vacated the officer
Idaho Law. In Idaho, a Section 18-8002A license suspension must
did not have legal cause to stop the driver's vehicle. Here, the troop

er stopped Watkins because

on the rear of the cab of his
the vehicle driven by Watkins was traveling with improper lighting
truck. See R., p. 10.
In Idaho, all lighting devices and reflectors mounted on the rear of

any vehicle shall

display or reflect a red color. Idaho Code Section 49-910 provides:
ted on the front or on the
side near the front of a vehicle shall display or reflect an amber color.
on the rear or on the
(2) Rear clearance lamps and marker lamps and reflectors mounted
sides near the rear of a vehicle shall display or reflect a red color.
any vehicle shall display or
(3) All lighting devices and reflectors mounted on the rear of
may be red, amber,
reflect a red color, except the stoplight or other signal device, which
be white and the
or yellow, and except that the light illuminating the license plate shall
light emitted by a back-up lamp may be white, amber, or red.
(1) Front clearance lamps and marker lamps and reflectors moun

The use of Idaho Code Section 49-910 as the basis for the traffic

stop was discussed by

479 (Ct. App. 2004) . In
the Court of Appeals in State v. Patterson, 140 Idaho 612, 97 P.3d
red
Patterson, the officer observed a vehicle being driving with what appea

to be a broken

Patterson was
taillight emitting white light. The officer effected a traffic stop and
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ultimately

has moved to
charged with a felony DUI and a misdemeanor resisting an officer. Patters on
suppress the evidence based upon the legality of the traffic stop.
red
Idaho Code Section 49-906 specifically provides that tail lamps "shall emit a
11
vehicle
light. Section 49-910 provides that lighting devices mounte d on the rear of a
11
Exceptions
.
iguous
unamb
"shall display or reflect a red color. This language is plain and
to this red light requirement are outlined within section 49-910 and include, signal
ure had
devices, the light illuminating the license plate, and back-up lamps. If the legislat
in the
it
d
intended to allow an exception for colors other than red, it could have include
statute. Instead, both section 49-906 and 49-910 refer to only the color red when
to
discussing colors that may be emitted from taillights. The statutes cannot be read
of any other
require taillights to emit red light but then also allow taillights to emit a light
ity
color of a driver's choosing. If that were the case, there would be little or no conform
statute
so that drivers could predict the motion of other vehicles. Althou gh the Texas
etation of
examined in Vickna ir is similar to LC. § 49-906, we are not alone in our interpr
,
Further
such statutes. See~ e.g., Williams v. State, 853 P.2d 537 (Alask a Ct.App.1993).
by
Patterson's argume nt that it is permissible to have a damag ed taillight is refuted
on."
Section 49-902, which requires that all lamps be "in proper conditi
Based upon the plain reading of LC.§§ 49-902, 49-906, and 49-910, Patterson
red.
violated Idaho law by driving with taillights that emit light of a color other than
he saw
Therefore, the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Patterson's vehicle when
abuse
not
did
Patterson's taillights emitting white light. Consequently, the district court
its discretion in denyin g Patterson's motion to suppress.

Id, 97 P.3d at 482.
Here, Watkin s argued that IC 49-910 is statute directed at "vehicle equipment"

and that

found refe1Ting to a
the Watkins' vehicle 's equipm ent complied with the law. No Idaho case was
can be probab
cargo light. The issue of whethe r the use of the cargo light, mounte d on the cab,

ly

2 Cir. 2004)
cause for a traffic stop was discussed in State v Brown, 871 So.2d 1276 (La. App.
was that
(attached as Exhibit A}. In Brown, the trooper admitted that the only reason for the stop
the rear cargo light was on, the court wrote:
stop was
On cross, Troope r Bonne r candidly agreed that the only11 reason for the traffic
vehicle, i.e.
the
of
lights"
rear
the
as
that the rear cargo light was on. What he referred to
located at
the brake lights and tail lights, were operating correctly. Those "rear lights" are
top and rear,
the rear end of the truck bed. The cargo lamp is on the cab of the truck at its
be 11 the rear
but because it emits light to the rear, Trooper Bonne r considered the light to
of the vehicle" for purpos es of La. R.S. 32:309(C).
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the
Comm on experience indicates that cargo lamps illuminate toward the rear of
they easily
truck upon which they are mounted. When such lights are illuminated at night,
use,
may confuse or distract a following motorist to believe that a backup light is in
we
ore,
which is what the pertinent Title 32 section is designed to regulate. Theref
d on
disagree with the district court and conclude that such a white cargo lamp is mounte
the rear of the vehicle.

Id. The court in Brown concluded and held:
ing
Here, the basis for the initial traffic stop was the trooper's belief that a rear-fac
ble
reasona
a
gave
this
white lamp was being used improperly. Under the traffic code,
traffic
basis to believe an offense was being committed. Accordingly, there was a valid
ible at trial.
stop. The evidence of intoxication discovered as a result of that stop is admiss
Id.

159 Idaho
Watkins also cited the Idaho Supreme Court issued an opinion in State v. Neal,

439, 362 P.3d 514 (2015). The facts of Neal were as follows:

Shortly before midnight on Novem ber 14, 2012, Boise Police Officer Ryan
Neal
Thueson began following Nathan David Neal in a patrol car. Thueso n observed
line")
drive his pickup onto, but not across, the line at the edge of the roadway (the "fog
follow
to
ed
continu
n
Thueso
near the intersection of State Street and Ellen's Feny Drive.
Gary Lane,
Neal until, about one mile further west, near the State Street intersection with
y.
roadwa
the
of
he saw Neal again drive onto, but not across, the line at the edge
drive onto
According to Officer Thueso n's original report, at the time he observed Neal
and the
Lane
Gary
near
line
fog
the fog line twice. Thueso n leamed later that there is no
onto Gary
line actually marks a bicycle lane. Thueson stopped Neal after he tumed right
Lane.
motion to
Id., at 439, 362 P.3d at 516. The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the granting ofa
suppress because the Court held that "driving onto but not across the line markin
of the road does not violate Idaho Code Section 49-637 and therefore the officer

g the right edge

's stop of Neal

was not justified..,
court
The facts of the Neal are distinguishable from the facts in Watkins. In Neal, the
line. Here, Watkins
found that there was no law violation for driving onto, but not across, the fog
was stopped because of was the trooper's belief that a rear-facing white lamp
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was being used

improperly. As such, Idaho case law supports the conclusion

that there was legal cause to stop

Watkins.

NTATION DO NOT RENDER
B. INACCURATE STATEMENTS IN THE ISP DOCUME
THE SUSPENSION INVALID
because the documents delivered
Watk ins' argues that the suspension should be vacated
from ISP contained a "fals e statement in the sworn statem

ent." Specifically, the police report states

11. Watk ins' argw nent is without merit
that Watkins "refu sed to subm it to a breat h test." R., p.
e grounds for a challenge to a license
because the argument "misperceives both the permissibl
f at the administrative
suspension unde r§ 18-8002A(7) and the burde n of proo

hearing." See Kane

v. ITD, 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 130 (Ct. App. 2003).

It is clear that the statement regarding refusal of the breat
error in the police repor t because that statement is incon

h test is a typographical/clerical

sistent with all the other evidence in the

trooper refen ed to Watkins taking and
Agency Record. Every other reference to the facts by the
of the Probable Cause statem
failing the breath test. For example, on the second page

ent it states:

'
did. Watkins spit out the chew
I asked Watkins ifhe had chew in his mouth and he said he
I explained to Watkins not to
and I checked to ensure his mouth was now clear and it was.
n period using my digital
burp or belch for the next 15 minutes and started the deprivatio Administrative License
the
time on my witch. During the depravation period I read
mity to Watkins for the entire
Suspension (ALS) form to Watkins. I stayed within close proxi
. I asked Watkins if he had
deprivation period and did not see or hear him bwp or belch
Watkins provided two breath
and he shrugged his shoulder and did not give a clear answer.
samples on the Lifeloc FC20BT. The results were .0921.089.
ment Operations log are part of the
R., pp. 10-11. Also the "Brea th Test Results" and the Instru
to a refused breat h test is clearl
Agency Record. R., pp. 7-8. Therefore, the lone reference

y only

a typographical/clerical error and a technical flaw.
license suspension as set forth in
The five grounds available to vacate an administrative
rized to vacate a suspension
Idaho Code. § 18-8002A(7). The hearing officer is not autho
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based on

In Kane v. !TD, 139 Idaho 586, 83 P.3d 130
technical flaws in the documents delivered to ITD.
was invalid because the documents that were
(Ct. App. 2003) the driver argued that his suspension
Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(5)(b). The
sent to ITO by the Officer did not comply with the
attorney for the driver argued:
was on the wrong form and thus did
(1) Officer Erickson's affidavit submitted to the ITD
11
the sworn statement be made 0n
not meet the requirement of I.C. § 18-8002A(5) that
nt"; (2) in addition to being on the
forms in accordance with rules adopted by the departme
in all of the information required by
wrong form, Officer Erickson's affidavit did not conta
n could not be upheld without the
I.C. § 18-8002A(5); and (3) the one-year suspensio
ensions.
original documents of record showing Kane's prior susp
for two main reasons because the driver's
The Court of Appeals rejected the drive r's arguments
for a challenge to a license suspension under
argument ,:misperceives both the permissible grounds
nistrative hearing.·• The Court stated the
§ l 8-8002A(7) and the burden of proo f at the admi
following:
avit and othe r documents
First, Kane's complaints that Officer Elickson's affid
and regulatory requirements
forwarded to the ITD did not comply with the statutory
h a license suspension may be
presupposes that such a failure is a ground upon whic
l 8-8002A(7). This supposition
challenged in an administrative heari ng under I.C. §
erates five grounds upon which
disregards the plain language of that statute, which enum
of which concern the adequacy of
a hearing officer may vacate a license suspension, none
rcement officer. Section 18documentation sent to the ITD by the initiating law enfo
vacate the suspension unless he
8002A(7) specifies that the hearing officer "shall not
suspension. Therefore, a hearing
finds" one of the five enumerated bases to set aside a
d upon technical flaws in
officer is not authorized to vacate a suspension base
documents delivered to the ITD.
onfo1mity with certain
Kane's second contention is that because of their nonc
ments sent by Officer Erickson did
requirements of the statutes and regulations, the docu
blood alcohol test was properly
not prove legal cause to stop his car or prove that the
of proo f at the hearing. It was not
administered. This argument misperceives the burden
e for the stop, to prove
the ITD's burden at the administrative hearing to prove legal caus
any of the possible grounds for
the reliability of the bloo d alcohol tests, or to disprove
contrary, the statute directs that
challenging a suspension unde r§ 18-8002A(7). To the
11
g the hearing. I.C. § 18-8002A(7).
"[t]he burden of proo f shall be on the person requestin
atively showing one or more of the
Thus , it was Kane's bw·den to present evidence affirm
is, it was his burden to prove
grounds for relie f enumerated in § 18-8002A(7). That
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le or that the blood test
that, in fact, the officer lacked legal cause to stop Kane's vehic
nts. This burden is not
was, in fact, not conducted in accordance with legal requireme
quate or
the ITD are inade
met by merely showing that documents in the hands of
her the blood test was
inadmissible to reveal whether legal cause existed or whet
his burden; his challenge to
conducted properly. Kane presented no evidence to meet

adequacy of the ITD's
the suspension consisted solely of a technical attack upon the
the ITD had no burden to
documentation. Because Kane made no prima facie showing,
present any evidence at all to the hearing officer.

Id at 590, 83 P.3d at 134 (emphasis added).

2013), the hearing officer
In ITD v Kalani-Keegan, 155 Idaho 297,311 P.3d 309 (Ct. App.
r did not comply with Idaho Code
found that the documents forwarded from the police office
that because the probable cause
Section 18-8002A(5)(b). Specially, the hearing officer found
officer, the notary certificate which
affidavit did not contain an original signature of the arresting
which contained a statement from
followed was invalid. ITD filed a Motion for Reconsideration
vit. In her statement, the notary
the notary whose name appeared on the probable cause affida
14 and, in her presence, signed the
declared that the a11'esting officer appeared before her on June
i-Keegan. The District Court upheld
probable cause affidavit relating to the DUI arrest of Kalan
t of Appeals vacated the decision
that decision and ITD appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Cour
t of Appeals held that ITD had
of the hearing and the decision of District Court. The Cour
ng officer erred
demonstrated prejudice to its substantial rights and that heari

when he vacated the

suspension. The errors by the hearing officer included:
that a failure to submit an
Fourth, the hearing officer rendered the further legal conclusion
requires this administrative
"original" signature constituted a "fatal error in procedure [that]
ng officer concluded that the
license suspension to be vacated." It is not clear why the heari
. Perhaps the reference to the
perceived procedural e1Tor was fatal to the license suspension
r, that the sworn statement
invalidating of the notary certificate meant, to the hearing office
d constitute a procedural
was no longer sworn, although it is not clear how that woul
not forwarded to the ITD in
error. Perhaps the statement that the required documents were
in procedure for the hearing
compliance with the Idaho Code constituted the fatal failure
whic h demands that the
officer. However, there is nothing in the Idaho Code
r, in the documentation.
suspension he vacated upon some failing"perhaps, even mino
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Id, 311 P.Jd at 318. The Comt of Appeals also cited the grounds set forth in Idaho

Code Section

18-8002A(7) for vacating and license suspension, and stated the following:
appear as
The failure to forward docwnentation mentioned in LC.§ 18-8002A(5) does not
in the
a ground for vacating a suspension. Moreover, a perceived irregularity
the
While
documentation does not appear as a ground for vacating a suspension.
d that the
hearing officer here determined that the asserted procedural error require
none of
that
found
suspension be vacated, at the same time, the hearing officer expressly
established.
the grounds for vacating a suspension set forth in LC. § 18-8002A(7) had been

Id., 311 P.3d at 318 (emphasis added) .
that the
InAtw oodv. ITD, 155 Idaho 884,31 8 P.3d 653 (Ct.App.2014), the driver argued
affidavit submitted by the police officer did not comply with Idaho Code Section

18-8002A(5)(b).

The Cowt of Appeals rejected this argument, in part because an insufficient affidav

it is not one of

s stated:
the grounds to vacate an administrative license suspension. The Court of Appeal
this Court
Further, even if the plain language of the statute is not dispositive of the issue,
nt officer.
differe
a
has already held that a sworn statement can contain observations from
), the
In Wheeler v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 148 Idaho 378,22 3 P.3d 761 (Ct.App.2009
who
officer
the
from
ations
arresting officer submitted a sworn statement and used observ
statement
initiated the traffic stop to indicate legal cause. Wheeler argued that the sworn
ed
contain
ent
statem
the
e
was improperly considered by the hearing officer becaus
inadmissible hearsay from a different officer. This Court stated:
r the
Idaho Code Section 18-8002A(7) provides thatIIa hearing officer may conside
sworn statement of the arresting officer which shall be admissible at the heruing
11
without further evidentiary foundation. Additionally, IDAPA gives presiding
officers at administrative hearings the discretion to exclude certain types of
evidence and provides that " all other evidence may be admitted if it is of a type
67commonly relied upon by prudent persons in the conduct of their affairs." LC.
5251 (1 ). A hearing officer is not bound by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. IDAPA
04.11.0 I .600. Accordingly, the heru-ing officer was not prohibited from
r's
considering hearsay evidence in its consideration oflega l cause to stop Wheele
other
by
d
supplie
vehicle. Furthermore, an officer may rely on information
officers, and II the collective knowledge of police officers involved in the
le
invest igation - including dispatch person nel- may support a finding of probab
).
cause." State v. Carr, 123 Idaho 127,13 0,844 P.2d 1377, 1380 (Ct.App.1992
s
officer'
g
arrestin
the
ring
Therefore, the heru·ing officer did not err by conside
r's
sworn statement relating the visual observations justify ing the stop of Wheele
vehicle on the suspicion of DUI made by the officer who pulled him over.
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Wheeler, 148 Idaho at 383,223 P.3d at 766. Following the reasoning of Wheeler, we
conclude that it was proper for Officer Lenda to rely on Corporal Cox's observations in
his sworn statement. Thus, the sworn statement was sufficient to provide ITD with
statutory authority and to satisfy the statutory requirements for suspension of Atwood's
driver's license.
Moreover, Atwood's argument that ITD lacked statutory authority to suspend his
license is not one of the grounds in which a hearing officer may vacate the suspension.
In Kane, this Court stated:
First, Kane's complaints that [the officer's] affidavit and other documents
forwarded to the ITD did not comply with the statutory and regulatory
requirements presupposes that such a failure is a ground upon which a license
suspension may be challenged in an administrative hearing under I.C. 188002A(7). This supposition disregards the plain language of that statute, which
enumerates five grounds upon which a hearing officer may vacate a license
suspension, none of which concern the adequacy of documentation sent to the
ITD by the initiating law enforcement officer. Section l 8-8002A(7) specifies that
the hearing officer II shall not vacate the suspension unless he finds" one of the
five enumerated bases to set aside a suspension. Therefore, a hearing officer is not
authorized to vacate a suspension based upon technical flaws in documents
delivered to the ITD.

Kane, 139 Idaho at 590, 83 P.3d at 134. Thus, Atwood's contention that the sworn

statement was deficient to provide ITD with statutory authority to suspend his
license is not a valid ground to challeng e his suspension. Instead, Atwood has the
burden to show that in fact the evidentiary test was deficient. Atwood makes no such

argument.

Id, 318 P.Jd at 656 (emphasis added). Likewise, Watkins' assertion that the sworn statement
was deficient to provide ITD with statut01y authority to suspend his license is not a valid ground

to challenge his suspension.
Assuming, for the sake of argument only, that the ISP error in the documents was relevant,
Watkins also had the burden of proving substantial prejudice to a substantial right. Therefore,
Watkins needed to produce affomative evidence that the false information in the police report
violated a substantial light. There is an absence of proof on this issue.
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TESTING
C. THE TROOPER WAS CERTIFIED TO OPERATE THE BREATH
EQUIP MENT

A license suspension may be vacated if it is shown that the testing was not done

in

2A(7)(d). Watkins
compliance with Idaho rules and procedures. See Idaho Code Section 18-800
also argues that there was no showing that the officer was properly certified to

operate the breath

testing equipment. This argum ent without legal or factual merit.
The Notice of Teleph one hearing informed Watkins that "Office r Certifications"

can be

es/breathobtained through the Idaho State Police website: http://isp.idaho.gov/forensics/servic
the hearing, as to
alcohol. R., p. 3. Therefore. Watkins was given information, in advance of
how to check the certification records of individual officers including Chris Middle

ton. 1

In this matter, the hearing officer correctly made the following findings of fact:
nt
1. Counsel for Watkins contends the Probable Cause Affidav it comple ted by Sergea
FC20
Middleton is deficie nt for not indicating ifhe was certifie d to operate the Lifeloc
by
breath testing instrument. Therefore, the evidentiary breath sample s collected
be
should
Sergeant Middleton should be invalid. On these ground s the suspension
vacated.
Operation
2. Idaho State Police Standa rd Operating Procedure 4.1.3 provid es that the
ation is
becomes certifie d by comple ting a training class approv ed by ISPFS. The certific
d to
for 2years. Certification will allow the Operator to pe1form all functio ns require
or to
obtain a valid breath alcoho l test. It is the responsibility ofthe individual Operat
their
maintain their curren t certification; the ISPFS may not notify Operators that
certification is about to expire.
fication for
3. Idaho State Police Standa rd Operating Procedure 4.1.3.1 provid es recerti
another 2 years is achiev ed by completing an ISPFS approv ed class.
is no grace
4. Idaho State Police Standa rd Operating Procedure 4.3.3.1 provid es that there
period or provis ion/or extension ofOperator certification.
d to
5. A review of tile lSPFS website confirms Sergea11t Middleton becam e certifie
an
conduct evidentia,y breath testi1tg utilizing tlie Lifeloc FC20 on April 16, 2019, with

includes a
Idaho State Police website has made it simple to obtain officer certification and
equipment. As
web address to obtain the ce1tification ofldah o officers to operate beath testing
ist, granted
stated by the hearing officer, Trooper Chris Middleton was a Breath Testing Special
on April 16, 2019 and expires on April 16, 2021.
1 The
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expiration date ofApril 16, 2021. Sergean t Middleton was certified to opel'ate tile
breath testi,zg instrum ent 011 October I 0, 2020.

6. Although the law enforcement officer's certification is often included in an ALS record, it
is not statutorily required to be submitted
See R., p. 42.

Here. Watkins had the burden of proof. He did not meet his burden of proof because the
hearing officer found that Sergeant Middleton was properly certified to operate the breath testing
equipment. The hearing officer wrote:
The burden is upon Watkins, who must show by a preponderance of the evidence
that the evidentiary breath test was not conducted in compliance with IDAPA Rule
11.03.01 (Rules Governing Alcohol Testing) and Idaho State Police Standard Operating
Procedures.
In this case, Watkins presented no affirmative evidence to meet his burden, but
9.
rather his challenge to the Probable Cause Affidavit consisted solely of a technical attack
upon the adequacy of the state's documents.
The Probable Cause Affidavit submitted by Sergeant Middleton provides the
10.
evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Code§ 18-8004, the IDAPA
Rule, and Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedure.
8.

Sergeant Middleton is certified to operate the Lifeloc FC breath testing
11.
instrument, with current certification expiring on April 16, 2021.

Sergeant Middleton monitored Watkins for 15 minutes prior to evidentiruy breath
12.
testing.
The Probable Cause Affidavit submitted by Sergeant Middleton shows by a
13.
preponderance of the evidence the evidentiary test was performed in compliance with
Idaho Code§ 18-8004, the IDAPA Rule, and Idaho State Police Standard Operating
Procedures.
A review of the totality of the record shows the evidentiary test was pe1formed in
14.
compliance with IDAPA Rule and Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedures.
See R., p. 42-43. This Court is bound to the finding of fact of the hearing officer unless the
finding is not based upon substantial evidence. There has been no showing that the trooper was
not properly certified therefore Watkins' argument fails.
VI.

CONCLUSION

ITD respectfully requests that this Court uphold the decision of the hearing officer and
that the Court vacate the stay of the driver's license suspension.
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Before GASKINS, CARAWAY and LOLLEY, JJ.
WRIT GRANTED; MADE PEREMPTORY; REMANDED.
In this case of first impression, we are called upon to construe La. R.S. 32:309(C) which provides in pertinent part
light
that "all lighting devices ... mounted on the rear of any vehicle shall display or reflect a red color ... except that the
a
of
side
back
the
on
located
lamp,
cargo
a
emitted by a backllp lamp shall be white." The issue presented is whether
little
a
at
that
testified
Bonner
Harvey
Trooper
vehicle.
said
of
rear"
the
"on
mounted
is
pickup truck's pass enger area,
past midnight on March 15, 2004 he made a traffic stop on the defendant and his pickup truck. Trooper Bonner made
the stop solely bec.ause the truck's white cargo light was activated. He testified that he makes stops on that basis "quite
often" Just to advise the drivers to turn off the lights which may distract or blind drivers behind them. On this occasion,
,
as soon as defendant Brown got out of his truck, Bonner noticed Brown was Intoxicated. After further investigation
offense.
DWI-first
for
and
32:309(C)
R.S.
La.
under
lighting
improper
for
citations
issued
Bonner
Trooper

On cross, Trooper Bonner candidly agreed that the only reason for the traffic stop was that the rear cargo light was
on. What he referred to as "the rear lights" of the vehicle, i.e. the brake lights and tail tights, were operating correctly.
and
Those "rear lights" are located at the rear end of the true!< bed. The cargo lamp Is on the cab of the truck at its top
for
vehicle"
the
of
rear
"the
be
to
light
the
considered
Bonner
Trooper
rear,
the
to
rear, but because it emits light
purposes of La. R.S. 32:309(C).
https://casemakerlegal.corn/doc;Vlew.aspx?Doc;ld=14675027&1ndex=D%3a%5cdtsearch%5clndex%5c01test%5
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1
are
Common experience indicates tt ·argo lamps illuminate toward the rear of t 'ruck upon which they
believe
to
motorist
following
a
,
•.•
dist,
or
confuse
may
easily
they
night,
at
,ed
....
illumin
are
mounted. When such lights
disagree
we
Therefore,
that a backup light is in use, which Is what the pertinent Title 32 section Is designed to regulate.
vehicle.
the
of
with the district court and conclude that such a white cargo lamp Is mounted on the rear

that the
It Is well settled that the right to make an investigatory stop must be based on reasonable cause to believe
); State
(La.1981
1312
So.2d
396
,
Rodriguez
v.
State
activity.
suspect has been, ls, or is about to be engaged In criminal
State v.
1991);
Cir.
4th
(La.App.
392
So.2d
588
Patterson,
v.
State
1993);
Cir.
2d
(La.App.
114
So.2d
v. Washington, 621
Thibodeaux, 531 So.2d 284 (La.App. 3d Cir. 1987).
M 1 Su.i!d I 2iU

used
Here, the basis for the initial traffic stop was the trooper's belief that a rear-facin g white lamp was being
y,
Accordingl
.
committed
being
was
offense
an
believe
Improperly. Under the traffic code, this gave a reasonable basis to
trial.
at
admissible
is
stop
that
of
result
a
as
discovered
n
there was a valid traffic stop. The evidence of intoxicatio
The writ is granted and made peremptory. The matter is remanded for further proceedin gs.
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